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The Dar ul-Islam (Islamic State) movement, commonly referred to 
as the DI, which terrorized the mountainous areas of West Java between 
1948 and 1962, has received comparatively little analysis despite the 
impact it had on the newly independent Indonesia. Such Western schol­
ars as Nieuwenhuijze and Kahin* 1 offered ideological and economic ex­
planations for the movement while it was still alive. Long after it 
was over, Jackson and Moeliono suggested that the course of action 
taken by the three Sundanese villages of West Java, which they studied 
with regard to their affiliation to the DI, derived from their adherence 
to a general Indonesian cultural ethos, bapakism (unquestioning loyalty 
and obedience of inferior to superior), rather than from any specific 
political orientation.2 On the Indonesian side there is the regional 
government report on the DI in 19543 and Pinardi's journalistic bi­
ography of the leader of the movement, Kartosuwirjo.4 In general, 
however, the Indonesian sources have tended to be hostile to the leader 
and the movement largely because of the atrocities committed by the DI 
in the villages and difficulties caused for the newly independent gov­
ernment, and perhaps also because of the latter's embarrassing inability 
to suppress the movement promptly.
An unsatisfactory aspect of all these materials is their failure 
to recognize the movement as one that was born in an attempt to realize 
Islamic ideals in a time of political chaos and revolutionary war and 
one that had strong popular support at least at the initial stage of 
its development. The movement only gradually lost its popular support 
in the final course of the Republic's struggle for independence as the 
DI almost imperceptibly crossed the threshold where most ulama (reli­
gious scholars) halted, at least temporarily, in favor of that inde­
pendence .
The hope for an Islamic state is something that no Moslem may 
allow to be extinguished (kena padam). To pursue this goal is every 
Moslem's duty. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of
* This paper is based in part on field research sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foun­
dation for Anthropological Research and the National Science Foundation.
1. C. A. 0. van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Dar ul-Islam Movement in West Java," Pacific 
Affairs, XXIII (1950), pp. 169-183; and George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revo­
lution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 326-331.
2. Karl D. Jackson and Johannes Moeliono, "Participation in Rebellion: The Dar'ul 
Islam in West Java," in R. William Liddle (ed.), Political Participation in Modem 
Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph Series 
No. 19, 1973), pp. 1-57.
3. Departemen Penerangan, Republik Indonesia Propinsi Djawa Barat (Jakarta: 1954).
4. Pinardi, Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (Jakarta: Aryaguna, 1964).
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ulama hoped for the proclamation of a Negara Islam Indonesia (Indone­
sian Islamic State) when the Republic was about to be born.5 They saw it 
as a logical consequence of the fact that more than ninety percent of 
the population was, at least nominally, Moslem and they believed that 
Islam provided an alternative comprehensive basis of government to the 
old colonial system. Such hopes were particularly high in West Java 
and above all in Banten and Priangan where the political and sociologi­
cal role of the ulama had long been conspicuous. Twice during the 
course of the Revolution the ideal of an Islamic state had some chance 
of realization in this region; once after the hijrah (retreat) of the 
Republican armed forces from West Java following the Renville Agreement 
of February 1948, and again after the fall of the Republic in December 
of that year. Smail reported that late in the Revolution armed con­
flict between secular and santri (committed Moslem) elements was the 
most striking feature of the political struggle in rural areas of West 
Java.6 In the end, however, while the majority of ulama and santri 
communities indeed hoped for an Islamic State of Indonesia, they opted 
for the independent Republic rather than the DI. Furthermore, it is 
unlikely that even Kartosuwirjo himself, at least initially, intended 
to lead the movement as far as it eventually went. He adjusted and 
altered his plans until finally he was left with no alternative but to 
pursue his initial goal by means of a civil war against the Republic.
The DI movement was basically the result of three factors, to be 
discussed in turn in the first section of this article: (1*) the long­
standing failure of Islamic political parties to achieve an Islamic 
state or to give united leadership to the Islamic community; (2) the 
chain of historical events centering around the nation’s rise to inde­
pendence; and (3) the personal ambition and charismatic leadership of 
the DI leader, Kartosuwirjo. The second section will give an ethno­
graphic account of the experience of the village Cipari, West Java, 
during the Revolution,and its subsequent relations with the DI move­
ment. This village, where the writer spent one year, is not exactly a 
typical village in West Java since it is the kampung where Kiai Yusuf 
Tauziri grew up and where he remained during the period under consider­
ation .
Kiai Yusuf’s family had been active in Islamic politics since 
the time of the Sarekat Dagang Islam.7 Later, accused of beings involved 
with the Afdeling B of the Sarekat Islam (SI)8 after the Cimareme 
Affair in Garut in 1919,9 his father and brother were imprisoned for
5. B. J. Boland, The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1971), pp. 15-34.
6. John R. W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution 1945-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph Series, 1964), p. 128.
7. The Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Trade Association) was founded in 1911 in 
Bogor, West Java, by Raden Mas Tirtodisurjo who had founded a similar organiza­
tion, Sarekat Dagang Islamyah, in Batavia in 1909, and another, also called Sare­
kat Dagang Islam, in Solo, Central Java, in 1911; see Robert Van Niel, The 
Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1970), pp. 89-90.
8. The Sarekat Dagang Islam changed its name to Sarekat Islam in 1912 when it was 
reorganized by H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto; see ibid., p. 92.
9. The Cimareme Affair was a small incident in which a certain Haji Hasan and his 
sons made armed resistance to Dutch tax-collections. In the course of the inci­
dent, the authorities uncovered a secret movement, referred to as the Afdeling B 
(Section B) of the Sarekat Islam, which aimed at overthrowing the Dutch. It was
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over three and a half years along with most other ulama in Garut. His 
uncle, Haji Adra, who headed the Afdeling B in Garut between 1918 and 
1919, went into exile in Singapore until independence. Kiai Yusuf him­
self served on the Central Council of the Partai Sarekat Islam Indone­
sia (PSII)10 between 1931 and 1938. During this period he met Kartosu- 
wirjo and became one of his mentors. He is sometimes held to have been 
responsible for Kartosuwirjo1s mystical inclinations.11 The relation­
ship lasted for several years after independence. In fact, Kiai Yusuf 
was the real spiritual leader of the DI movement during its first 
phase, and he supported it financially and militarily as well.12 But 
soon after the DI turned against the Republic, he discontinued his sup­
port, initiating a conflict which was to culminate in a large-scale 
attack on his village in 1952. The ethnohistorical account below, 
given by the villagers, the local ulama and the kiai (Islamic notables) 
suggests their views and understanding of what happened to them during 
these years, the most spirited and yet among the most troubled in the 
nation’s recent history.
Party Politics and the Genesis of 
Kartosuwirjo 1s Utopian Project
The modern Islamic political movement, initiated toward the end 
of the first decade of this century, was able to increase its member­
ship very rapidly, incorporating various smaller groups and leftist 
elements, under the charismatic leadership of H. 0. S. Tjokroaminoto. 
During the partyTs peak period in the late 1910s attitudes towards the 
colonial government became increasingly militant. Von der Mehden tells 
us that at the party’s third congress in Surabaya in 1918 "Tjokroaminoto 
showed the temper of the congress by implying that non-parliamentary 
means might be used if demands were not met."13 The following year’s 
Cimareme Affair and the uprising in Toli-Toli, Sulawesi, however, crys­
tallized colonial fears, resulting in increased pressure on Indonesian 
organizations. Tjokroaminoto was detained in relation to the Afdeling 
B Affair, damaging his and the Si’s reputations. In 1921, the Commu­
initiated by Haji Ismael in 1917, and, according to my informants who took part 
in it, was much more extensive than officially reported, involving even the 
Sultanate of Cirebon. This underground group planned to ship Russian arms into 
Java through the port of Cirebon. For the Cimareme Affair, see Sartono Karto- 
dirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development," in Claire 
Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1972), pp. 71-125, For Afdeling B, see William A. Oates, "The Afdeeling B: An 
Indonesian Case Study," Journal of Southeast Asian History (March 1968), pp. 
107-17.
10. The Sarekat Islam changed its name to Sarekat Islam Indonesia in 1923 and became 
Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia in 1929; Van Niel, The Emergence, p. 92, and Ruth 
T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1965), p. 144.
11. Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 148.
12. Describing the relationship between Kiai Yusuf and Kartosuwirjo, Nieuwenhuijze
says: "Leadership of the movement, initially in the hands of the kiyahi . . .
was gradually assumed by a Muslim politician, S. M. Kartosuwirjo . . . and [he] 
sometimes acted in rivalry with the original leader." "The Dar ul-Islam," pp. 
174-75.
13. Fred R. von der Mehden, Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), p. 63.
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nists and their followers, who composed a large part of the SI, were 
expelled by the party.
There were other factors, too, in the SIfs decline. The Dutch 
tried to block the party’s political activities by manipulating puppet 
organizations such as the Sarekat Hijau (Green Association) in Priangan, 
which harassed local cadres and generally discouraged popular partici­
pation. 1Lf Newly founded organizations like the Nahdlatul Ulama (1926) 
and the Partai Nasional Indonesia (1927) vied for the Si’s rural and 
urban constituents as well. Internal disputes led to the expulsion of 
Muhammadiyah members.14 5 As a result of all this, the movement, which 
claimed two million followers shortly after 1912 and over three million 
in 1919, had completely lost its mass following by the end of 1924.16
The loss of a large section of its followers and Tjokroaminoto*s 
death in 1934, in turn, intensified internal conflicts among the par­
t y ^  leaders. One after another, factions critical of the central 
party leadership were purged from the party. In 1933 Sukiman, Wiwoho, 
and their followers were disciplined for disclosing the central admin­
istration’s mismanagement of the Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Bumipu- 
tera (Pawnshop Employees1 Union).17 In 1936, the issues of how to 
respond to the government’s interference in matters of Islamic law 
(marriage and inheritance) and whether or not to accept a subsidy from 
the colonial authorities to alleviate the party’s financial crisis, 
divided the party leadership between those who favored cooperation and 
those who opposed it. Fearing further paralyzation of the party’s 
activities, Haji Agus Salim, then the chairman of the Party Council, 
proposed the adoption of a cooperative policy and the creation of the 
Komite Barisan Penyedar (Committee of the Front for Building Conscious­
ness). Another faction, led by Abikusno Tjokrosujoso (a younger brother 
of H. 0. S. Tjokroaminoto) rejected Salim’s proposal and expelled him 
and twenty-nine of his followers from the party leadership in February 
1937. Thereafter, the PSII for a while maintained with dogmatic rigid­
ity rather extreme Islamic theocratic doctrines of noncooperation with 
the colonial authorities.18
Kartosuwirjo’s early political life coincided with the long, bit­
ter decline of the once-powerful Islamic movement. He started his 
political career in 1923 by joining the Jong Java (Young Java) youth 
organization while still in medical school in Surabaya. When the 
Islamically oriented faction of this organization broke away in 1925 
to form the Jong Islamieteh Bond (Young Islamic League), he followed 
suit. Because of his leanings toward radical leftist activism, he was
14. The Sarekat Hijau was a loose cluster of organizations with no real connection 
between them. Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 200, and McVey, The Rise, 
pp. 295-96.
15. The Muhammadiyah was a reformist Moslem organization founded by Haji Achmad 
Dachlan to provide socioeducational assistance to Moslem communities. Van Niel, 
The Emergence, p. 85.
16. Ibid., pp. 105, 156-57, and 209-10.
17. Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Bumiputera was founded in 1916 and led by the 
central Sarekat Islam; see Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 139, n. 150; 
McVey, The Rise, p. 43.
18. Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958), 
p. 226, n. 92; and Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, pp. 138-46.
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expelled from the medical school and was taken in by his foster father, 
Tjokroaminoto, whom he served as private secretary between 1927 and 
1929. In 1929, however, he fell ill and retreated to his wife's vil­
lage in Bojong, Malangbong, West Java. In the same year he served as 
the PSII commissioner for West Java and in 1931, at the age of 26, be­
came general secretary of the party, a position he held until 1936.19 
At the party congress in 1936,at which Salim and Roem proposed to 
establish the Komite Barisan Penyedar, he was elected vice-president 
under the leadership of Wondoamiseno. He proved to be such an ardent 
advocate of uncompromising doctrinal radicalism that at the congress' 
request he wrote a brochure on the subject of hijrah (retreat). While 
the issue of hijrah meant no more to most of the party than a termino­
logical dispute over the party's policy towards the colonial govern­
ment, Kartosuwirjo took it seriously to mean the actual practice of 
what Muhammad had done in Medina after A.D. 622.20 He proposed to 
begin by creating a Suffah Institute,21 but the 1938 congress ended 
without any action being taken on the matter. By the time of the 1939 
congress in Bandung, the PSII had already shifted towards the coopera­
tive "parliamentary route" by joining the Gabungan Politik Indonesia 
(Gapi, the Political Federation of Indonesia) along with seven of the 
most important nationalist organizations, and Kartosuwirjo's proposal 
was called an anachronism and rejected.
Kartosuwirjo and his supporters, including Kamran,. then head of 
the party's youth section, and Kiai Yusuf, thereupon established a fac­
tion called Komitd Pembela Kebenaran (KPK, the Committee for the De­
fense of Truth). A small number of members of the central executive 
committee then accused Kartosuwirjo of misusing contributions from 
Sumatra and, in a rather obscure fashion, expelled him from the party.22 
This expulsion was formally confirmed at the party congress in Surabaya 
in January 1940.23 * In March of that year the KPK, sometimes called the 
PSII-II, emerged as a new political party.29 On March 24, 1940, Karto­
suwirjo founded his Suffah Institute, a commune equipped with a modern 
pesantren25 at Bojong, Malangbong, the native village of his Sundanese 
wife, Wiwiek Ardiwisastra.
As a political party, the KPK was successful only in West Java.26 
At its first congress, held in Babedahan, Garut, in 1940, only six 
former PSII branches attended: Cirebon, Cibadak, Sukabumi, Pasanggra-
han, Wanaraja and Malangbong. There Kartosuwirjo proposed a total 
hijrah, requiring every member of the party to contribute 2,500
19. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Univer­
sity Press, 1972), pp. 423-24; and Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, pp. 20-23.
20. Pinardi, Kartosowirjo, pp. 24-25; and Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, pp. 
146-48.
21. Suffah refers to "an institution at the time of the Prophet at which a number of 
young men were instructed by the Prophet himself in order to propagate Islam." 
Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 340.
22. Interviews with Kiai Yusuf. 23. Benda, The Crescent, p. 226, n. 96.
24. Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 268.
25. Pesantren are the traditional Islamic dormitory schools.
26. Kartosuwirjo's claim that at every PSII branch there was a KPK (Pinardi, Karto­
suwirjo, p. 26) is an overstatement, while Noer's (The Modernist Muslim Movement,
p. 149) statement that the KPK branches were all in Central Java does not coin­
cide with my informants' claims.
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kencuring (unit of currency) and to move to the Suffah. Kiai Yusuf 
disagreed with this and offered a counterproposal--investing the money 
in land so that the harvest could be used to support the training of 
future ulama at the Suffah,27 Kiai Yusuf did not think that the time 
was ripe for a total hijrah. For many ulama, moving to a commune was 
almost impossible, since they had their regular religious and social 
services to perform in their respective villages. This disagreement 
was the beginning of the split between the leaders of the KPK.
Kartosusuwirjo went ahead with his project, but it was not uni­
formly successful. Not all the people who joined the commune and 
pooled their wealth to support the Suffah were prepared for the kind 
of life they were to lead. Many of them were old and previously weal­
thy landlords: they could not tolerate the egalitarian way of life, 
the hard labor, and the poor diet and medical services available. On 
the other hand, the commune’s pesantren successfully adopted unorthodox 
methods and offered, besides regular religious classes, Dutch, astron­
omy and militant Islamic doctrines. Up until the Japanese invasion 
this pesantren moderen attracted not only many santri from the area 
but even some from outside Java.28 Kiai Yusuf supported the pesantren, 
at least indirectly, by sending two of his sons and a nephew as train­
ers and trainees. The threat of a Japanese invasion thereafter kept 
the colonial authorities’ attention away from these activities. It 
was left to the Japanese occupation government to ban the KPK. The 
Suffah was discontinued, and many members returned to their' villages, 
much poorer than before they moved to Malangbong.
Discouraged and disgusted by what he saw as the disunity and oppor­
tunism of the established Islamic leaders, Kartosuwirjo now began to 
built a militant rural base in West Java. The Japanese occupation of 
Indonesia over the next three years offered him exactly the kind of 
opportunity he needed to prepare for the realization of his vision of 
the ideal State.
The Chain of Historical Developments 
Centering around the Nation’s Independence
The Japanese occupation, lasting from March 1942 to August 1945, 
contributed significantly to laying the basis of the later DI in two 
respects. On the one hand, it reinvigorated the Islamic State concept 
among Islamic leaders and, on the other, it gave certain Indonesians 
an opportunity to obtain basic military training.
Having recognized the de facto authority of the ulama and kiai in 
the rural areas, the Japanese, on occasion, favored these Islamic 
groups at the expense of the intellectual and urban nationalist elite. 
As a result, the expectations and political ambitions of many hitherto 
rather other-worldly and aloof rural Islamic leaders grew rapidly.
Yet at the end of the occupation the balance of power altered deci­
sively in favor of the politically more experienced nationalists. As 
a result, by the time of the Japanese surrender, nationalist and Is­
lamic forces were more aware of their antagonism than previously, and 
the concept of the Islamic State became a highly visible issue between 
them.2 9
27. Interviews with Kiai Yusuf and Ajingan Fudori.
28. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, pp. 26-27. 29. Benda, The Crescent, pp. 169-94.
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Equally important for politicizing the masses and increasing their 
hope for independence was the number of opportunities given to get mil­
itary training, to which most Indonesians had had no access during the 
Dutch period. In mid-1943 HeihQ (Auxiliary Troops) were initiated as 
part of the Japanese army and in October the Pembela Tanah Air (Peta, 
Defenders of the Fatherland) was established.30 Then in the last year 
of the occupation, largely in response to local pressures, the Japanese 
authorities agreed to provide military training for Islamic groups in 
the form of the Hizbullah (Army of Allah), as a subsidiary of the 
Majlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi, Council of Indonesian Moslem 
Associations), the Japanese-sponsored federation of Islamic organiza­
tions .
During the Japanese occupation Kiai Yusuf's political and reli­
gious influence in southeast Priangan increased. The Japanese built a 
sulfur plant in the town of Wanaraja, where the kiai was then residing, 
and a road from the town to a village on Mt. Telagabodas where the 
Japanese engineers were settled. As a result, the town's commercial 
life was invigorated, allowing Kiai Yusuf to expand his influence 
throughout the region and paving the way to the later formation of the 
Hizbullah. Recognizing Kiai Yusuf's influence, high-ranking Japanese 
officers made frequent visits to his madrasah. 31 After the Japanese 
promise of ultimate independence for Indonesia, the number of the 
kiai's followers and attendance at his pengajian (religious lectures) 
grew considerably, including people from as far as Sukabumi and even 
some urban nationalists from Bandung. When the Hizbullah was organized 
in West Java in early 1945, Kiai Yusuf headed the local branch, called 
Tentara Dar ul-Salam, or Esa Selamat (United Defense Force), which re­
cruited its members from Cicalengka, Ciparay, Majalengka, Sukabumi, 
Pameungpeuk, Bungbulang, Cikajang and Wanaraja. The group was large 
enough to form a battalion. Every Friday morning, Japanese instructors 
from Garut marched into the square in front of Yusuf's madrasah and 
gave military training until the time for the noon prayers; on Thurs­
days, pengajian meetings were often turned into opportunities for Japa­
nese and Indonesian propagandists to campaign.
As for Kartosuwirjo himself, his activities during the Japanese 
period were constructive and cooperative in the sense that he worked 
with prominent nationalist leaders on matters of national significance, 
transcending the exclusive and parochial concerns he had previously 
displayed. During mid-1943, as a committee member of the Majlisul 
Islamil a'laa Indonesia (MIAI, Great Indonesian Islamic Council),32 he 
agitated for the establishment of a network of ulama throughout Java 
and the creation of an Islamic treasury for administrating the collec­
tion and distribution of zakat (obligatory Islamic alms tax) to aid 
the needy and alleviate the distress caused by wartime economic dislo­
cation. This new Islamic welfare organization, known as Bait al-Mal, 
was probably the public project most enthusiastically received by the 
Islamic community during the early Japanese period. But it was brought
30. Anderson, Java, pp. 20 and 25-26; and Smail, Bandung, p. 14.
31. A madrasah is a place where adult Moslems attend pengajian given by ulama and 
kiai. It is also used by village children and santri students to practice ngaji 
(Quranic recitations). It differs from the more systematic Islamic education 
given in the pesantrdn.
32. Benda, The Crescent, p. 90 and pp. 143-46. MIAI was a loose Islamic federation 
established five years before the occupation. It continued to exist marginally 
until Masyumi replaced it in 1943.
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to an unfortunate halt when the Japanese saw in it a threat to their 
control. After this setback, Kartosuwirjo served as Masyumi commis­
sioner for West Java and at the same time joined the Hokokai shortly 
after its establishment in March 1944.33 During his participation in 
the Hokokai organization, he worked with other leading Islamic and 
nationalist leaders including Sukarno, Hatta, Mansur, and Abikusno 
Tjokrosujoso at its Jakarta headquarters.34 Toward the end of the 
occupation, he acted as a Hokokai guerrilla-training supervisor in 
Banten,35 while at the same time he headed the local Hizbullah in 
Malangbong, the site of his former Suffah Institute. It is of impor­
tance to note that his constant travels during this period contributed 
to establishing a network of connections with West Java rural ulama 
who were later to support the DI. Many of the trainees in his local 
Hizbullah became his anak buah, followers, and subsequently formed the 
core of the DI organization.
The Early Revolutionary Period
As far as the formation of the DI is concerned, the two most rele­
vant developments during the early phase of the Revolution were: the
mushrooming of irregular armed groups and the process of their absorp­
tion into the Indonesian national army; and the failure of the Repub­
lican leaders to negotiate the total sovereignty of the Republic free 
from Dutch control.
Shortly after the proclamation of independence by President Sukarno 
on August 17, 1945, the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR, People*s Security 
Corps) was formed for the maintenance of law and order. It was, how­
ever, nothing more than a loose territorial network largely composed 
of former members of the Seinendan (Youth Corps), Keibodan (Vigilance 
Corps)36 and Peta. Though formally an organization structured hierar­
chically from the residency level down to the kampung, it was not an 
army. The Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR, People’s Security Army), which 
replaced the BKR on October 5, 1945, on the other hand, was intended 
to be an army of full-time soldiers organized for national defense, 
particularly against the threat posed by Allied landings on Java in 
that month.37 Parallel to the creation of a national army, however, 
and especially during the violent months between October 1945 and mid- 
1946, many paramilitary youth organizations, generally called badan 
perjuangan (resistance organizations),sprang up spontaneously to par­
ticipate in the Revolution by seizing power and weapons from the local 
Japanese forces. Most of them were irregulars quite outside any cen­
tral control.
In West Java, these included the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia 
(Pesindo, Indonesian Socialist Youth) led by Sutoko, the Barisan Ban- 
teng (Wild Buffalo Legion) led by Rachmat Sulaiman, the Kebaktian 
Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi (Service of the Indonesian People of
33. Ibid., p. 153; Anderson, Java., pp. 27-30. Hokokai was a mass movement initi­
ated by the Japanese to mobilize and control the population.
34. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, p. 31.
35. Benda, The Crescent, pp. 179, 186, 280, n. 26, and 285, n. 57.
36. Anderson, Java, pp. 26-27. Seinendan was a militant, politicized scout organi­
zation to assist the authorities, while the Keibodan was intended as an auxil­
iary police force to help maintain order and security. Both were formed on 
April 29, 1943.
37. Smail, Bandung, pp. 76-78.
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Sulawesi) led by Karundeng, the Pemuda Indonesia Maluku (PIM, Moluccan 
Youth of Indonesia) led by Pellupessy, the Hizbullah, and the newly 
created Sabilillah led by Kamran, Kartosuwirjo’s right-hand man.38 
These badan perjuangan were heavily concentrated around Bandung, where 
Allied troops were stationed, and by mid-November, 1945, they coordi­
nated themselves into the Markas Dewan Pimpinan Perjuangan (MDPP, 
Resistance Leadership Council Headquarters). Upon its own initiative 
the MDPP was transformed late in February 1946 into the Majlis Persa- 
tuan Perjuangan Priangan (MPPP, Council of the United Resistance of 
Priangan), coordinating some sixty-one regional politico-military 
groups.39 The MPPP, headed by Sutoko and Kamran, held jurisdiction 
over its coordinated military units, which still remained as irregulars 
outside the national army. Meanwhile, Colonel Nasution, Commander of 
the Third Division of the regular army, had been pressing the badan 
perjuangan forces to permit unification and absorption into official 
armed forces. Yet in view of the limited number of arms available in 
West Java, he felt that a screening of these troops was essential, so 
that only the best qualified would be incorporated into the army.40 
The process of absorption, however, was severely hindered by Nasution1s 
defeat at British hands. He was compelled to abandon Bandung on March 
24, 1946, and it took a long time for the MPPP-formed Resimen Tentara 
Perjuangan (Resistance Army Regiment), composed of its best-qualified 
soldiers, to be fully incorporated into the Third (Siliwangi) Division.
Obviously, these developments left many high-spirited, unsophis­
ticated guerrilla fighters outside the nationalist army. Many of these 
irregulars, feeling little rapport with the often Dutch-trained and 
Dutch-educated Siliwangi officers, even preferred to remain outside.
The major badan perjuangan thus continued to dispose of considerable 
numbers of soldiers. Even among the Siliwangi troops themselves there 
were men who were disillusioned about their prospects within the na­
tional army. To a greater or lesser degree, all these groups were 
potentially open to Kartosuwirjofs appeals at the time of the initial 
formation of the DI.
Kartosuwirjofs activities during this early revolutionary period 
were fairly typical of badan perjuangan leaders. Though more than dis­
appointed by the absence of a Negara Islam in Sukarno’s Proclamation 
of Independence, in the face of the Allied landings on Java he never­
theless moved his best cadres in Hizbullah to Bandung. Since Kamran, 
who headed the West Java Hizbullah, was his right-hand man, he held a 
firm grip on the provincial Hizbullah movement. When the wartime 
Masyumi organization was transformed into a political party on Novem­
ber 7, 1945, he became its secretary,41 and, in the following year, its 
commissioner for West Java.42 He also worked closely with Hasjim, then 
head of the Hizbullah section of the central Masyumi leadership. Be­
tween 1945 and 1947, by resisting Defense Minister Amir Sjarifuddin1s
38. Team Penerangan Umum, Badan Penelitian-Penjusunan Sedjarah Djawa-Barat, Sedjarah 
Djawa Barat Suatu Tanggapan (Bandung: Pemerintah Daerah Djawa-Barat, 1972), 
Tambahan p. 8.
39. Smail, Bandung, p. 144, n. 108, adds that the MPPP was also commonly understood 
as Markas Pimpinan Perjuangan Priangan (Headquarters of the Resistance Leader­
ship of Priangan).
40. Ibid., pp. 129-45. 41. Anderson, Java, pp. 219-20.
42. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, pp. 31-32.
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"rationalization" efforts, Kartosuwirjo successfully kept rural Sabi- 
lillah and urban Hizbullah units under his control.1*3
The year 1946 ended without any conclusive results from the nego­
tiations between the Dutch and the Republic. The Republican leadership 
was divided, while the British were anxious to withdraw their troops 
from Indonesia and the Dutch were gradually building up their strength. 
Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan (Union of Resistance) movement, which 
had demanded an unconditional transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch, 
disintegrated after the abortive coup of July 3.44 Probably never 
having fully trusted the Republican leaders’ capacity to win full inde­
pendence through diplomatic means, Kartosuwirjo had his suspicions 
confirmed by the weakness the Republic demonstrated in the ill-famed 
Linggajati Agreement (initialed on November 15, 1946, ratified by the 
Indonesian Parliament on March 5, 1947, after much internal debate, 
and signed by both governments on March 25, 1945).115 The fact that 
during the subsequent two months Sjahrir, faced with the threat of all- 
out war, made further concessions to the Dutch appears to have con­
vinced Kartosuwirjo that armed struggle was inevitable if real indepen­
dence was to be achieved. It is significant that when, after the fall 
of the third Sjahrir cabinet, the new Prime Minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, 
offered him the position of Second Vice-Minister of Defense on July 3, 
1947, Kartosuwirjo pointedly declined it and returned to Malangbong to 
strengthen the Hizbullah units in Priangan for the expected Dutch 
attack.46
The war that broke out on July 21, 1947, resulted in an overwhelm­
ing victory for the Dutch. In West Java all the major cities fell into 
their hands. Though the Republican army had prepared for the attack, 
their lightly armed troops had no choice but to retreat to the moun­
tainous areas of the interior where they hoped to recoup their strength 
and wage prolonged guerrilla warfare. After several weeks both sides 
agreed to a cease-fire in response to UN pressures, but the Dutch con­
tinued to reoccupy areas where they had large economic interests. By 
August 29, when the Dutch established what was generally called the 
Van Mook Line, supposedly defining the position they had held at the 
time of the cease-fire, the Republic was left holding a large part of 
the traditionally food-deficient province of Central Java, the Banten 
residency at the western tip of West Java, a portion of East Java, half 
of Madura, and the poorest part of Sumatra.47
In view of the virtual rout of the Republican forces in West Java, 
Kartosuwirjo initiated a conference in November 1947 at Mt. Cupu, lo­
cated on the border between the regencies of Garut and Tasikmalaya. 
Backed by Masyumi, the conference resolved to establish a Dewan Perta- 
hanan Ummat Islam (Moslem Community Defense Council) in Garut to coor­
dinate the available local Hizbullah and Sabilillah units, and a Majlis 
Ummat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Moslem Community Council) in Tasik­
malaya to administer the movement.48 Ignoring the cease-fire, Kartosu­
wirjo and his Hizbullah forces intended to recapture the Dutch-held 
territories in South Priangan.
43. Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History (New York: Praeger, 1963), 
p. 113.
44. Anderson, Java, pp. 370-403. 45. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 196-206.
46. Ibid., pp. 196-212. 47. Ibid., pp. 213-21.
48. Nieuwenhuijze, "The Dar ul-Islam," p. 175; Brackman, Indonesian Communism, p.
112.
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The lack of effective United States support for the Indonesian 
cause and the weak military position of the Republic resulted in criti­
cal concessions on the part of the Republic when negotiations were re­
sumed. By the Renville Agreement, signed on January 19, 1948, the 
Republicfs territory was reduced to less than one-third of the area of 
Java. As bad as this was for the Republic, it was even worse for the 
people of West Java. The TNI troops there had to be evacuated to 
Republican-held territory, leaving the main Sundanese areas in 
Dutch hands. The loss of the Siliwangi Division, popularly regarded 
as a Sundanese army despite the fairly large number of non-Sundanese 
troops in it, made the local population feel like anak tiri (stepchil­
dren), abandoned by the Republic.49
Kahin has estimated that some 35,000 regular troops in all obeyed 
the hijrah (evacuation) orders while about 4,000 remained behind;50 the 
local people say today that the actual ratio between the two in West 
Java was about four to one. It appears that both the TNI (regular 
army) and the irregulars took spontaneous actions to resist the hijrah. 
At least one battalion of the TNI is said to have remained out of uni­
form near each of the major cities of West Java to assist the activi­
ties of the irregulars. They included, for example, the Sugiharto 
battalion, and Brigade I/Tirtayasa.51 A large number of Hizbullah, 
whether members of the Resimen Tentara Perjuangan or not, also remained, 
and almost none of the Sabilillah abided by the Renville terms.52 Sev­
eral other units, including two Pesindo battalions led by General Fatah, 
also evaded evacuation.
The Dutch followed up their military success by establishing a 
puppet Pasundan government for West Java on February 26, 1948. It is 
important bear this in mind, for the DI movement was initiated not only 
for the military defense of West Java in defiance of Renville, but also 
to challenge, in the name of Islam, reimposed Dutch colonial rule sym­
bolized by Pasundan.
On February 10 and 11, 1948, what is now seen as the first "DI 
conference" was held at the village of Pangwekusan, in the district of 
Cisayong, Kabupaten Tasikmalaya. It appears that at this stage of its 
development, the DI' s leaders did not wish so much to call for the imme­
diate establishment of an Islamic State as to organize and coordinate 
all the remaining armed forces under their control. The movement that 
emerged out of the meeting was a loose coordination of various Islamic 
and non-Islamic groups somewhat resembling the structure of the old 
MPPP. The name DI may have been used at the time but it has been sug­
gested that the letters DI did not then refer to Dar ul-Islam but to 
Daerah I (Region One)53 of the movement, whose primary goal was to re­
capture West Java from the Dutch. This suggestion is supported by the 
presence of such non-Islamic groups as Pesindo at the conference. The 
Islamic organizations represented at the meeting included Masyumi, the 
Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (GPU, Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement,
49. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, p. 32. 50. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 234.
51. Team Penerangan Umum, Sedj arah, p. 271, and Tambahan p. 18.
52. Smail, Bandung, pp. 51-52.
53. Boland, The Struggle, p. 57. According to Kiai Yusuf,D I referred at the time
to the primary area of defense where large numbers of Indonesian troops were 
concentrated, whereas D II referred to Dutch-controlled areas with scattered 
resistance forces.
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an affiliate of Masyumi), Hizbullah and Sabilillah. The organizational 
structure of the resistance movement tentatively drawn up at the meet­
ing and confirmed at a second conference held two months later at 
Cipeundeuy shows: (1) that the movement was independent of Masyumi,
one of the major parties represented in the Republican cabinet respon­
sible for the implementation of Renville; (2) that administration of 
the movement was to be under the leadership of the Majlis Islam (MI, 
Islamic Council); and (3) that the Tentara Islam Indonesia (Til, Indo­
nesian Islamic Army) was to be formed to consolidate the local security 
forces.
It seems that the movement's status vis-a-vis the Republic became 
the key issue of a debate which developed during subsequent months 
among its member groups. The defense of West Java as a regional coun­
termove against the puppet state of Pasundan was strongly supported by 
all groups, but the Holy War concept was generally acceptable only to 
the Islamic forces. But, in addition, the idea of establishing a Negara 
Islam, abandoning the unitary Republic, was beyond what most of the 
Islamic groups under Kiai Yusuf's influence were seeking. This ideo­
logical disagreement was partially resolved by the regional Hizbullah 
and Sabilillah and such non-Islamic irregulars as the Pesindo from 
Cirebon returning to their respective areas to concentrate on local 
efforts against the Dutch,while maintaining loose ties to the DI as a 
sort of coordinating body of the resistance. By the t.ime the Til was 
formed only one Hizbullah group, that of Tasikmalaya led by Oni (later 
to become Prime Minister of the DI), remained with Kartosuwirjo. The 
latter now took further steps towards the formation of an Islamic State 
by convening a third conference in May at Cijoho. A Dewan Fatuz 
(Supreme Council) along with ten ministries was formed and a Qanun 
Azasi (Constitution) was to be prepared to form a Jumhuriah (Republic) 
headed by an Imam (Chief) based on the Quran and the Al-Hadith.54 5 By 
then the movement was clearly headed for the establishment of Kartosu­
wir jo's Negara Islam. On May 5, 1948, he proclaimed himself Imam.
Though no longer recognizing the unitary Republic, the DI "government" 
remained pro-Republic rather than pro-Dutch. Meanwhile, its Islamic 
army controlled the larger part of the mountainous countryside of West 
Java where the Dutch had few economic interests.
The resumption of Dutch aggression on December 19, 1948, and the 
disintegration of the Republican government in Java following the igno­
minious capture of its leaders marked a turning point for both the 
Republic and the DI movement. During the subsequent months, the DI, a 
movement which had hitherto not opposed the Republic, began to show 
open signs of aggressive antagonism to it.56 Aroused by the Dutch on­
slaught, rural kiai and ulama, who had once been loyal to the Republic, 
now joined the DI movement or supported its operations, since the DI 
now formed the real core of popular resistance. As is common in trou­
bled times, bandits in many areas of West Java began to cluster around 
the fringes of Dl-held territory to exploit the local villagers in the 
DI's name.
In any event, as the number of its followers increased, the DI's 
tactics became more uncompromising. When the Siliwangi fought its way 
back into West Java early in 1949, they often encountered unexpected 
opposition from the DI, Units moving through the mountains at night
54. Team Penerangan Umum, Sedj arah, pp. 273-74.
55. Ibid., p. 273. 56. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 329-30.
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to avoid Dutch attacks, and ignorant of the change in the DIfs attitude 
toward the Republic, accepted invitations to share meals with DI sol­
diers and were subsequently captured along with their weapons. As some 
of my informants suggested, the DI!s opposition to the Siliwangi may be 
attributed to Kartosuwirjo1s fear that a successful Siliwangi operation 
in West Java might help to restore the Republic’s authority in West 
Java, thus jeopardizing his initial hope of retaining the DI’s autonomy 
and its territorial jurisdiction over the regions under its military 
control.
It looks as if the DIfs formal proclamation of a Negara Islam on 
August 7, 1949, in the village of Cisampak, Kecamatan Cilugalar, Kabu- 
paten Tasikmalaya, was the result of careful consideration on Kartosu- 
wirjo’s part.57 As a consequence of the Rum-van Royen Agreement of 
May 7, the Republican government had been restored to Yogyakarta in 
July. On August 1, a cease-fire agreement was signed between the Dutch 
and the Republic, and mounting guerrilla pressures on, and civilian 
non-cooperation with, the Dutch brightened considerably the prospects 
for a total transfer of sovereignty. Finally, international pressures 
forced the Dutch to agree to discuss the terms of transfer with the 
Republic at a Round Table Conference planned for later that month at 
The Hague. Events were moving very rapidly and the DI had to make 
momentous decisions.
Kartosuwirjo1s proclamation of a Negara Islam on August 7, 1949, 
suggests that it was probably a direct reaction to a letter sent to 
him two days earlier by Natsir, Minister of Information in the Republi­
can cabinet, expressing the government’s desire to prevent a definite 
break.58 It had long been apparent that Kartosuwirjo was strongly 
against the formation of a federal state of the kind the Dutch were 
proposing (which would have allowed them to manipulate the component 
states against Yogyakarta). But whether the proclamation was meant to 
be more than a claim for territorial autonomy, as a component state 
alongside the Republic in some larger federation--as ”a state within 
the State”--once the formal transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch was 
accomplished, is not clear. In any case, Kartosuwirjo’s proclamation 
won him still more support from local Islamic groups, and by the time 
the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch actually took place on 
December 27, 1949, the DI controlled most of the mountainous areas of 
southwest Java from Banten to Priangan.
If Kartosuwirjo and his DI really aimed to form no more than a 
member state in a larger federation, however, the chance to achieve 
this was completely closed when the Republic moved to create a unitary 
state by dissolving all the Dutch-created states and dismantling the 
federal system.59 Kartosuwirjo and the DI were left with no alterna­
tive but to continue their resistance to the secular Indonesian state.
After the proclamation of the unitary Republic on August 17, 1950, 
a whole range of local elements, disturbed by the settlement of 1949-50, 
emerged to disrupt the new status quo. U1tracolonialists, including 
some intelligence agents and military officers determined to discredit 
the Republic, used federalist sentiment and Sundanese ethnicity for 
their own purposes, and carried out terrorist operations in Bogor, 
Purwakarta, Subang, Indramayu, Majalengka, Kuningan and around Bandung.
57. Team Penerangan Umum, Sedjarah, pp. 273-74.
58. Boland, The Struggle, p. 59. 59. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 446-69.
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Dissatisfied with the failure of the Sukarno-Hatta government to in­
clude West Irian as part of the Republic and to reduce the debts assumed 
from the Dutch, extremist groups such as the Gerakan Sakit Hati (Wounded 
Heart Legion) in Cirebon caused many disturbances in West Java. Among 
all of these, the most significant, however, was the DI, which survived 
for another decade, and expanded its zone of operations from north 
Banten, Bogor, Sukabumi, Cianjur, Bandung and South and East Priangan 
to Sumedang and the towns around Cirebon.60
Kartosuwirjo and His Followers
Practically everyone I interviewed said two things about the DI 
movement. One was that the goals of the DI were just, but that its 
means were against ajaran agama (religious teachings). They also agreed 
that without the benefit of Kartosuwirjo's aggressive character, his 
ambition and his capacity to win loyal support, the DI could not have 
lasted as long as it did. In this section, I will examine Kartosuwir- 
jo's leadership and his followers' loyalty.
Oddly enough Kartosuwirjo had very little Islamic education. He 
never attended a pesantr&n. (He studied Islam mostly from Dutch books,61 
and later Sufism from .several kiai in Priangan including Mustafa Kamil, 
Kiai Ramli, and Kiai Yusuf.62) Despite these deficiencies and his ur­
ban background, he had the qualities to become a charismatic rural 
leader. His sharp mind, eloquent tongue, and above all striking per­
sonality overshadowed his weak voice and small, unprepossessing figure. 
His speeches tended to be uncompromising and bevat (heavy), often ap­
pealing to his audience's conscience. He evidently possessed the in­
valuable quality, typical among Java's 3 ago ("champions") of being 
gagah (translated in a colloquial sense as "having guts"). According 
to the local people I spoke to, men who are gagah fear nothing but God, 
and are strongly convinced of their cause (yakin). They tell the truth 
even to the authorities without any fear of the consequences. Such a 
charismatic man inspires awe (segan) in his followers, who are them­
selves prevented from acting by fear of possible threats to their 
lives. While such a personality may be unusual in a culture that em­
phasizes harmony, obedience and avoidance of conflict, it is still an 
integral aspect of that culture, and,indeed, is the more powerful be­
cause of it. Where gagah behavior is associated with a high cause, it 
commands great respect and obedience. In rural Java high causes have 
traditionally been based on the values of communal peace, prosperity 
and social justice, and expressed either in indigenous (Ratu Adil, Just 
Prince) or Islamic (Imam Mahdi, Savior) idioms.
Kartosuwirjo's charismatic behavior and his uncompromising advo­
cacy of Islamic ideals seem to have fitted comfortably in with the 
peasants' age-old messianic hopes such as those evoked by the Joyoboyo 
prophecies.63 One of his closest followers reported that Kartosuwirjo
60. Team Penerangan Umum, Sedjarah, pp. 276-77.
61. Pinardi, Kartosuwirj o, p. 28.
62. Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, p. 148.
63. the medieval king Joyoboyo prophesied the appearance of a just prince after a 
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had propagated the message that he had received an order from God to 
become the Imam of the World Caliphate.64 Indeed, from the time of the 
establishment of the Suffah until his execution, he was always addressed 
by his followers as "Imam" rather than "Kiai."
Though Kartosuwirjo may have exploited rural cultural traditions, 
there is little doubt about his sincerity. Not much is known about how 
he developed his hatred for colonialism but, as Pinardi has pointed out, 
his considerable intellect gained sophistication as a result of his 
apprenticeship to Tjokroaminoto.65 Furthermore, his retreat to Bojong, 
Malangbong, following his illness, had much to do with his later radi­
calism. The village was located just off the major highway from Tasik- 
malaya to Bandung and it was primarily used by Dutch planters in East 
Priangan. He therefore had ample opportunities to observe the contrast 
between the deprived rural villagers and the Dutch estate-managers.
His active participation in the establishment of MIAI's Bait al-Mal 
campaign throughout Java during the Japanese occupation suggests a con­
version from the role of politician to that of a leader of a social 
movement. The fact that it was only by means of arms that the Japanese 
threw the Dutch out of Indonesia probably confirmed his growing convic­
tion that only through revolutionary means would the kind of society he 
envisioned become possible. His sincerity about the Islamic cause is 
also reflected in the kind of life he led at his Suffah Institute. 
Following the example of Muhammad in Medina, he always dressed simply 
and took part in menial labor, though only for short periods. As a 
dedicated Sufist, he spent many hours in self-discipline and communica­
tion with the supernatural.
Many local ulama and villagers attributed his ability to recruit 
followers among poor and unsophisticated peasants to his mystical pow­
ers. His mysticism is important above all because it is clear that 
stories of his miraculous qualities contributed to the continuation of 
his movement. Local people described Kartosuwirjo1s followers as orang 
keoil (literally, Mlittle people,1’ but contextually referring to people 
who are poor, without any position or influence), orang bodoh (’unedu­
cated1), orang merah (communists) and orang Jawa (Javanese), as if to 
say that no sensible Sundanese Moslem would be found among them. In 
fact, however, the DI was composed quite differently. Kartosuwirjo1s 
leading advocates, the so-called DI ministers, were largely men he had 
known since the time of the KPK and the Suffah Institute. These in­
cluded such colleagues as Kamran and Ateng Setiawan, and such leading 
students as Zainal Abidin, Tomi, Oni, Bakar (the DI’s Bupati of Garut) 
and Sujadi (Minister of the Treasury). The majority of them were Sun­
danese from Garut and Tasikmalaya with strong Islamic backgrounds. The. 
group of satria> responsible for protecting the top leaders from exter­
nal dangers,was made up of soldiers trained as members of Kartosuwirjofs 
Hizbullah during the Japanese occupation, including Haerudin, Busaeri, 
Subirman, Sasmoyo, Adung and Dawan.66 According to Pinardi and local 
villagers I interviewed, the ordinary TII troops included common peas­
ants, as well as bandits from as far off as Central Java.
64. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, p. 41. "Imam" refers to both the head of an Islamic 
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65. Ibid.> pp. 23 and 33.
66. Interviews with a former DI member and an ex-TNI intelligence officer.
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Ibrahim Adjie claimed that rumors about Kartosuwirjo's magical 
powers may have been fostered by his remoteness from the majority of 
his followers.67 * Judging from the examples given of such rumors, it 
seems likely that the DI's central leadership welcomed and even manipu­
lated them by shielding Kartosuwirjo from, and making him almost inac­
cessible to, his guerrilla fighters in the field. Kartosuwirjo was 
seldom seen by his followers and he did not allow his photograph to be 
taken. It was even believed that one had to go through seven layers of 
three hundred protecting soldiers before being able to reach the Imam. 
His whereabouts were known only to his closest associates. Eventually 
he was believed capable of disguising himself, of vanishing with the 
speed of light and of remaining immortal. This was the explanation 
given as to why he was never captured by his pursuers for over a dec­
ade. Some of these rumors offered detailed descriptions of such mirac­
ulous events as making generals fly into the air before followers 
skeptical about the holy cause. Moreover, the fact that the DI was 
believed to be engaged in a Holy War encouraged many devout Moslems to 
join, since, according to Islam, death in such a war guarantees entry 
into Heaven.
The interpretation of Kartosuwirjo's "miracles" by nonfollowers 
suggests something about the cultural and religious ideas that foster 
belief in magical power among the population in general. Among many 
Sundanese Moslems, miracles are regarded as possible if a person has 
one of several qualities. The first is a special power secretly granted 
by God to a dedicated Sufi saint whose state of total purification from 
worldly matters allows him to ascend to the atom gaib (invisible realm) 
and see God through the eyes of his heart. This power, ma'unat, is 
legitimate and sanctioned by the individual's religious superiority.
The second is the miraculous power granted to an ordinary Moslem who, 
as a result of hikmat (or himmah, God's favor and reward) earned by 
daily reciting the Asmaulhusna (ninety-nine names of God) , finds tempo­
rary escape from worldly limitations during times of immediate crisis. 
This special power, wibawa, is God's blessing for the individual's re­
ligious efforts but differs from the kind of transcendental power pos­
sessed by individuals with ma'unat. The third type (which derives from 
a syncretic mixture of indigenous and Islamic beliefs) comes from con­
trol of Islamic jin (spirits). Miracles performed on this last basis 
are illegitimate and identified as magic: they do not involve God's
power nor the individual's religious superiority. They are merely the 
result of techniques for creating an illusionary effect before specta­
tors. Local people concluded by saying that the combination of these 
three qualities in one person is possible, but the miracles caused by 
Kartosuwirjo simply to prove his power belonged to the last category, 
and were therefore false and illegitimate. Furthermore, they added, 
many of Kartosuwirjo's miracles were really to the credit of Ardiwi- 
sastra, his father-in-law!
The stories of his power to curse disloyal members also served to 
intimidate prospective DI deserters. Such rumors were given weight by 
repeated reports of people who "dropped out" of the movement being 
hunted down and executed. As the movement dragged on into the 1960s, 
many DI followers were willing to surrender to the TNI, but they were 
afraid that however they might try to hide themselves, Kartosuwirjo 
would find them and place a kutuk dewa (curse of God) upon them.
67. General Ibrahim Adjie was the military commander of West Java who led major cam­
paigns against Kartosuwirjo in the early 1960's.
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However sincere his goals may have been and whatever the methods 
he adopted to ensure the loyalty of his followers, Kartosuwirjo failed 
in one important respect that eventually turned most communities against 
his movement. He permitted the TII to carry out brutal massacres such 
as those at Cibugel, Ciinjuk, and Cikurahan. At his court trial Karto­
suwirjo later said that he himself had been greatly annoyed by these 
brutal acts committed by his followers,68 admitting in effect an in­
ability to control the activities of his followers. This may have 
been one consequence of his inaccessibility. As the movement spread, 
the DIfs Islamic courts failed to function, Islamic proscriptions 
against the persecution of kafir (unbelievers) were disobeyed, and dis­
cipline was not enforced. Many of the terrorist attacks upon villages 
during the first half of the 1950s were not organized to achieve any 
sophisticated political ends. This lack of sophistication is exempli­
fied by such a statement as: "Just as the young coconut which does 
not have the capacity to bear fruit must be burned down to its roots, 
so this must also be done to those kafir, Communists and villagers who 
refuse to accept the DI!s sovereignty.M69 Burning down villages and 
throwing corpses into the fire were seen as acts of pembersihan (puri­
fication), out of which a new and ideal state was to grow. By the 
late 1950s the DI appeared to be little more than a terrorist organiza­
tion completely cut off from popular support. This situation was to 
lead the movement to its eventual downfall.
The End of the Movement
In 1948, when the DI first began, it was legitimate in the eyes 
of many Indonesians, since it was not against the Republic. When the 
Republic destroyed the 1950 federal system just as the DI was rapidly 
gaining in strength, however, the movement became a cancer within the 
newly reborn Republic. Between October 1950 and February 1951 Kartosu­
wirjo sent two secret letters to Sukarno appealing to him to establish 
an Islamic State.* 70 Since the Republic remained a secular state, how­
ever, the DI sought separation from direct Republican control over its 
territory, as Kahar Muzakkar was to do in South Sulawesi and Daud 
Beureu'eh in Aceh.
The DI*s continued expansion through most of the decade derived 
not only from its own strength but also from other factors which weak­
ened the Jakarta government. First of all, sentiment for a Negara 
Islam, the DI's fundamental aim, was still pervasive among Islamic 
political parties. The Masyumi, which held cabinet posts between 1950 
and 1953, feared in particular that a direct drive against the DI would, 
result in a decrease in its electoral support,and therefore favored a 
settlement through peaceful negotiations.7! Nor was the army, though 
frustrated by the constraints imposed by the political parties, eager 
to fight fellow Indonesians.72 From the military point of view, the 
period between mid-1951 and 1953, when no other major rebellion was 
going on, would probably have been the best time for settling the con­
flict by force of arms. However, this was exactly the period in which
68. Ibid., p. 16. 69. Author’s interview notes.
70. Boland, The Struggle, pp. 60-61.
71. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 210-12.
72. Ibid., p. 412.
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The DI's strength was at its peak and the Masyumi's voice against a 
repressive drive most effective. As the Masyumi lost power to a coali­
tion of nationalists and left-wing groups after mid-1953, however, re­
bellions in other parts of the archipelago distracted both the govern­
ment and the army from attempting to organize a united front against 
the DI.
In the next decade Indonesia underwent both political and economic 
decline, and in Priangan the virtual absence of internal security caused 
by the DI insurgents contributed to the general deterioration of social 
conditions. Refugees from the fertile Priangan hills and plains flooded 
the major cities,thereby increasing the urban population along with the 
number of administrative problems. A sudden drop in agricultural pro­
ductivity and a virtual cessation of commodity flows between regions, 
resulting from disruptions of the transportation system, worsened the 
already inflationary conditions in DI areas. The possibility of de­
stroying the DI began to emerge only after the political climate in 
Jakarta changed in the early 1960s when Guided Democracy was put into 
effect.
In the new system the government's power under Sukarno's leader­
ship greatly increased, since it was no longer dependent upon parlia­
mentary backing. What is more, by the turn of the decade, Masyumi, 
which had been the strongest opponent of a military campaign to destroy 
the DI, had been declared illegal as a result of its involvement with 
the regionalist rebellion of 1958. The crushing of this made it pos­
sible for the first time to turn all the state's resources against the 
DI. These changes in the distribution of political power and the res­
toration of internal security in other regions put the DI in a weaker 
position vis-a-vis Jakarta than ever before.73
The Siliwangi then launched its Operasi Bratayudha and after 1961 
generated effective civilian cooperation in the form of pagar betis 
(literally, a fence of human legs).74 The foot of each rebel-held 
mountain was surrounded by a massive number of villagers with torches 
in their hands, while the army and members of the Organisasi Perlawanan 
Rakyat (People's Defense Organization) waited for the DI members to 
surrender. Many were captured by this method. Lured by the promise 
of clemency for those who voluntarily turned themselves in to army 
posts, many more openly deserted Kartosuwirjo. By the beginning of 
1962, the strength of the DI had become very small. People like Kamran 
and Oni were long dead, and Kartosuwirjo himself was in critical condi­
tion after being wounded by a bullet on April 24. He was finally cap­
tured on June 4, 1962, under circumstances that are still not altogether 
clear.75 * Through a radio announcement from Bandung and Jakarta, Karto­
suwirjo then ordered General Abdullah of the TII to surrender. The 
surrendering TII members left a deep impression upon spectators. Clad
73. Ibid., pp. 520-38; and Herbert Feith and Daniel S. Lev, "The End of the Indone­
sian Rebellion," Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, 1 (Spring 1963), pp. 32-46.
74. Team Penerangan Umum, Sedjarah, p. 290.
75. The army claims that he was captured on Mt. Goger in Central Priangan by the 
elite Kujang units of the Siliwangi (Team Penerangan Umum, Sedjarah, Tambahan
p. 23). Boland writes that he was discovered by an army patrol on Mt. Geber 
between Bogor and Cianjur (The Struggle, p. 62); and my informants reported that 
he was captured on Mt. Haruman near Leles in the district of Garut by one of 
the pagar betis operations.
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in black uniforms, the soldiers descended with dignity from the hill­
side DI territory. From their point of view, they surrendered only 
because of the Imamfs orders. The Siliwangi, headed by General Ibrahim 
Adjie, too, played their part by treating the surrendering soldiers 
with compassion.
The government handled the case with particular caution, in the 
hope of restoring peace and order in the region. All the DI/TII mem­
bers who surrendered at military posts were immediately released and 
most of those who were captured by the pagar betis were granted presi­
dential amnesty. Kartosuwirjo was interrogated for two months follow­
ing his capture while he recuperated from his wound. Around mid-August, 
together with five of his followers who had been imprisoned earlier on 
charges of attempting to assassinate President Sukarno in the Idul Adha 
Affair of May 19, 1962,76 he was brought before a military court. The 
trial lasted for four days and on August 18 all were convicted and 
sentenced to death. Kartosuwirjo was then secretly executed on Septem­
ber 12.77
Boland, comparing Kartosuwirjo with Kahar Muzakkar (shot to death 
in February 1965), says that he did not enjoy as much popular support 
after his death,78 but that some people, particularly among the spirited 
young men, expressed both sympathy for his tragic end, and admiration 
for his uncompromising devotion to the cause. Some former DI members 
who returned to their own villages were ostracized by other' villagers 
and, finding this intolerable, eventually moved away to cities or to 
villages in North Priangan around Limbangan and Malangbong, an area 
where the DI formerly had strong support and where orthodox religious 
fanaticism is still very much a part of life.
Cipari's Involvement with 
the DI and the Revolution
Kiai Yusuf knew Kartosuwirjo for almost twenty years before they 
came into conflict. Both families were in close contact because of 
their common interest in perjuangan politik (political struggle). 
Kartosuwirjo1s father-in-law, Ardiwisastra, was himself a well-known 
figure in PSII circles in West Java. Kartosuwirjo1s wife, Wiwiek, was 
also a militant activist and very close friend of Kiai Yusuf's younger 
sisters, who headed the women’s section of the G P U  in Garut. When 
Kartosuwirjo was expelled from the party, Kiai Yusuf also pulled out 
and supported indirectly both the KPK and Kartosuwirjo1s Suffah Insti­
tute. But after that, the kiai was never active in party politics 
again.
Following the Dutch invasion of Priangan in 1947, Kiai Yusuf and 
his Hizbullah played a leading role, along with Kartosuwirjo, in orga­
nizing the defense of the area. Members of his family were also pres­
ent at the conference held on Mt. Cupu in November 1947. For about a 
year between the TNI's hijrah and the return of the Siliwangi, Kiai 
Yusuf assisted Kartosuwirjo both financially and militarily, as did 
many ulama in Priangan. Support of the DI movement at that time was 
viewed as part of the continuing struggle for full independence from 
the Dutch, rather than an opportunity to take advantage of the power
76. Brackman, Indonesian Communism, p. 290.
77. Pinardi, Kartosuwirjo, p. 18. 78. Boland, The Struggle, p. 68.
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vacuum created by the evacuation of the Republican forces for the crea­
tion of an Islamic state. It was when the DI clearly moved toward the 
establishment of a Negara Islam at the expense of the Republic that 
Kiai Yusuf withdrew his support. He felt that to fight against the 
Republic for the creation of an Islamic State would be futile. His 
withdrawal, however, meant that the village of Cipari where he had his 
headquarters became a prime and constant target of the DI.
During the first half of 1949, therefore, his Hizbullah division 
fought against the Dutch and defended the village against the DI at 
the same time. In the eastern part of Garut, Dutch garrisons were 
found at Cibatu, Bakanloa and Sadang (respectively seven, one, and 
four kilometers from Cipari), while the DI!s operations stretched from 
the edge of the mountains surrounding the River Cimanuk to Cicalengka 
and as far as Bandung.
One Day in 1949
Not long after the burning of South Bandung in the spring of 1946, 
the town of Wanaraja, where Kiai Yusuf had lived, was also burned down 
by a group of leftist irregulars led by a man called Kosasih, who called 
themselves the Pasukan Pangeran Papak (Prince Papak's Troops). Kiai 
Yusuf and his family were forced to return to his native village of 
Cipari about three kilometers northeast of the town. Following the 
hijrah of the Republican forces in 1948, Kiai Yusuf had only a few 
followers with him. Most of the village youngsters who had been trained 
by the Japanese and had joined the TNI after the Proclamation of Inde­
pendence had left for Yogyakarta, and his largest Hizbullah unit was 
fighting alongside Kartosuwirjo in the mountains against the Dutch.
After he clashed with Kartosuwirjo, many of Kiai Yusuffs Hizbullah sup­
porters opted to remain with the DI rather than return to the village 
(among them were two of his cousins). In mid-1948, therefore, Kiai 
Yusuf's remaining Hizbullah unit consisted merely of young boys barely 
old enough to hold guns, and some pangongsi (refugees from mountain 
villages exposed to the DI) from Sindangheula.
Not knowing the real sympathies of the village, the Dutch soldiers 
stationed in Bakanloa,about one kilometer south of Cipari, gave the 
villagers military training for the purpose of "self-defense” against 
the DI. The village even made a deal with a Dutch officer in Garut to 
send them arms and ammunition in a small truck. So ignorant were the 
Dutch of Yusuf's real feelings that,when Pasundan was established, he 
was offered the post of Minister of Religious Affairs, which he de­
clined on the excuse of "failing health.”
When the second Dutch attack opened and the Siliwangi returned to 
West Java at the beginning of 1949, Cipari was better prepared. TNI 
soldiers returning to the village were reported to the Dutch as wan­
dering santri students attending the village pesantrdn. Kiai Yusuf 
headed the newly strengthened Hizbullah and from his headquarters in 
Cipari organized military operations coordinating all the available 
forces within the area of Cibatu, Pasanggrahan, and Sukawening. Their 
target was the garrison in Cibatu. The operations, led by the profes­
sional soldiers from the Siliwangi, always took place at night.
For a long time the Dutch could not identify the leader of the 
guerrilla operations nor locate his headquarters. After years of deal­
ing with the Dutch, Kiai Yusuf and his family had learned to deceive 
them by feigning submissiveness. Even after the Dutch had learned the
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name of the leader, Kiai Yusuf could still pass a Dutch officer on the 
street without being questioned. As the fighting increased and when a 
warrant for his arrest was issued, however, Kiai Yusuf literally went 
underground. A dry spot was chosen in one of the banana gardens and a 
hole was dug creating a seven-square-foot underground room. The hole 
was covered with dry grass and not even the villagers were told of its 
exact location. The kiai and Professor Musadaad,79 one of the best 
known of the kiaifs disciples, stayed there during the daytime only to 
come out after dark. Another hole was dug right underneath a wooden 
bunk bed for their emergency use. Weapons, stolen or purchased from 
the Dutch, left by the Japanese, or brought back by the TNI, were kept 
with one of the widows of the village, since she would be the last to 
be suspected of hiding such things.
The Dutch frequently made inspections in Cipari, but in the par­
ticular month when the incident to be related below occurred the Dutch 
had good reason to keep away, giving its inhabitants time to prepare 
another attack. The village had just suffered from a smallpox epidemic 
and several people had bandages on for over a month. To take advantage 
of the situation, Kiai Yusuf ordered villagers to keep their bandages 
on long after they had recovered, and put out a sign at the village 
entrance saying, "Smallpox in this village, stay away." It was eleven 
days before the military operation was to take place, letters with 
orders had been sent out, and the weapons had just been cleaned, when 
suddenly and unexpectedly the Dutch came to inspect the village.
Normally they would come in through the village gate but on that 
particular day six Dutch officers and one Ambonese entered the village 
from a path through the rice fields. "I [Kiai Yusuf*s sister] was 
chatting with my sister-in-law at her house near the gate of the vil­
lage. It was already toward the end of the day and the people were 
busy bathing their children and cooking meals. Then suddenly I saw my 
brother-in-law holding his arms above his shoulders and followed by 
six Dutch officers. I knew that my brother-in-law had a green TNI uni­
form in a sarong wrapped around his shoulders. I dashed out of the 
house and greeted the Dutchmen as usual in a most friendly tone and 
tried to lead them to my sister-in-law*s house while she went out to 
my brother, the Kiai*s, house, to warn him of the coming of the Dutch, 
but all was in vain.11
Kiai Yusuf had been taking that day rather easy and was outside 
his hiding place. By his house in front of the mosque he heard someone 
shouting, "The Dutch have come to Cipari," which he mistook for Cipari 
Babakan (the next village to the east of Cipari). Thinking he still, 
had time to call for his son who was a TNI returnee, he ran across the 
yard to his hiding place. But according to his sister, the Dutch had 
already spotted him. "When I reached my house, I saw two of my broth­
ers, Professor Musadaad, my mother and sisters all inside. No one was 
allowed to enter. So I walked around the house trying to do something 
about it. The Dutch searched for documents and weapons as proof of 
our plotting an attack. They confiscated six typewriters, all the 
documents, and seven weapons. I ordered my nephew to go quietly and 
quickly to the widow’s house and hide the remaining twenty weapons and 
ammunition in the graveyard and the fish ponds. I was always told by 
my brother the Kiai that if something happened to him and he could not 
continue the perjuangan, then I had to continue it on his behalf. About
79. Professor Musadaad is presently a lecturer at the Institut Agama Islam Negara 
(IAIN, National Islamic University) in Bandung.
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thirty years before, in 1919, when my father and my eldest brother were 
arrested by the Dutch in connection with the Cimareme Affair, my brother 
the Kiai carried on my father’s work. Now it was my turn. When the 
Kiai and the leading members of the family were about to be taken away, 
the children of the village who had lost their parents during the DI 
and the Revolution wept and cried: ’Don’t wait until tomorrow but let
them return home this evening.’ My brother was kind and always took 
care of these orphans, fed them and gave them clothes. The prayers of 
such innocent children are always heard by God."
At the Dutch garrison at Bakanloa, the men were treated well and 
with respect. "I [the Kiai’s nephew, a TNI returnee] was the first to 
be interrogated by the Dutch. I told them that the confiscated weapons 
were in the village only to be used for defense against DI attacks and 
not against the Dutch. God must have been there with us, because, my
Lord, the weapons which had been cleaned and polished that very morning
now looked rusty with red spots everywhere and they were dusty inside 
as if they had indeed not been used for a long time and probably would 
not be in the near future either. God indeed helps us, because when 
the Dutch tried to read the confiscated documents, the ink of the paper
was smeared and the writing was hardly comprehensible.
"Fortunately Dr. Musadaad could speak fluent Dutch and he chatted 
with the Dutch officers. They gave us meals and allowed us to go ahead 
with our evening prayers. Then around nine o ’clock, shortly after the 
prayer, there was a telephone call from Garut ordering the station to 
release all of us immediately. It was a sheer miracle. Even Kiai 
Yusuf had thought that he would never return home alive. According to 
later information, someone had apparently informed the kiai’s support­
ers in Garut, who in turn pressured the Dutch headquarters there into 
releasing Kiai Yusuf. The kiai was a fair man and he never judged 
people on their ethnic character but on their individual merits. He 
helped the Japanese at the time of their capitulation and stopped the 
people from massacring some Chinese when the Dutch colonial authority 
collapsed. So among his followers there were Japanese, Chinese and 
Dutch nationals. But what is strange indeed, on that particular day 
who could have passed word of the kiai’s arrest to Garut? In those 
days nobody walked at night for fear of the DI, and the only telephone 
near Bakanloa was located at the military post itself. God must have 
done something about it, for it simply does not make sense to us.
"We were sent home before midnight, and I will never forget the 
surprised look on my family’s faces when they saw us back. We all 
thanked God for His help and we swore that we would continue with our 
perjuangan for da'wah Islam (the spreading of Islam). The Dutch not 
only returned all the weapons and documents they had confiscated but 
also promised to provide the village with guards against any DI attack.
"In the fall of that year, only several days after the Round Table 
Conference was completed in which the Dutch agreed upon the total trans­
fer of sovereignty, we invited those Dutch military officers from Bakan­
loa to attend Lebaran [the end of the fasting month, marking the be­
ginning of the new Islamic year] celebration in the village. For the 
first time since the breakdown of the Renville Agreement, all the mem­
bers of the TNI in Cipari put on their military uniforms and sang our 
national anthem in front of the mosque. The Dutch were very surprised 
to find out that there were so many returned TNI members in the village. 
We were very proud and these sympathetic Dutch officers enjoyed sharing 
meals with us for the last time before they had to leave for home."
83
The release of Kiai Yusuf was probably related to the Dutch fear 
of peasant resentment. Antagonizing the peasants at a delicate time 
would have been the last thing the local Dutch military officers wanted 
in the face of the weakening Dutch position in West Java. To the vil­
lagers, who had little knowledge of the change in the international 
climate in favor of the Republic, however, the entire event was beyond 
their comprehension. To them the release of Kiai Yusuf by hitherto 
formidable Dutch officers was a sheer miracle, proof of Godfs blessing 
on the kiai and his followers, whose courage and dedication in the 
course of their perjuangan derived from their fundamental faith itself.
April 17, 1952: The PI Attack on Cipari
Cipari experienced a total of forty-six DI attacks between 1949 
and 1958, out of which seventeen inflicted serious damage. In those 
days it had become the custom for the people from nearby villages as 
well as from the mountains to seek refuge in the Cipari mosque every 
day after late afternoon prayers. Some of them brought their stoves, 
cooked meals there, stayed overnight and returned home only in the 
morning. For several months shortly after independence, the Siliwangi 
stationed a company in Cipari to protect what was obviously a DI tar­
get. As the frequency of DI attacks increased throughout Garut, the 
mosque-madrasah building in Cipari came to accommodate thousands of 
people. The most serious attack on the village took place, however, 
on April 17, 1952, after the Siliwangi pulled the company back from the 
village. It was then that the DI made their last serious attempt to 
finish off Kiai Yusuf and the village once and for all.
MMy house was then located right on the road leading into Cipari, 
and every evening we used to hide at the mosque in Cipari. That par­
ticular day, however, I [local ulama, Kiai Yusuf’s maternal cousin] 
had a meeting at Cimahi and did not come home until late afternoon. I 
was changing my clothes when my wife quietly said that there was a pa­
trol right outside the house. It did not take me long to realize that 
it was not an ordinary patrol from the Kecamatan police station but a 
troop of DI/TII soldiers sneaking in to surround the village of Cipari. 
I pulled my wife back and we hid ourselves behind the curtains and 
watched their movements. It was very unusual for the TII to come down 
so early in the evening and approach the village from the south, be­
cause they usually descended from the mountains north of Cipari. I was 
late in going to the madrasah that day and for just that reason we es­
caped the attack.,!
In Cipari the mood was different. Kiai Yusuf’s sister recalls:
”It was before the Isa prayers around seven thirty in the evening, when 
we heard that the DI were already near Cipari. Most of the people who 
moved into Cipari every evening to seek refuge were already in the 
building since the late afternoon prayers, but because we lived so near 
the madrasah we were still in our houses. My sister, who tended to get 
frantic at any unusual sight in those days, starting crying out that 
the DI was here, jumping here and there without knowing what to do. I 
did not believe it at first because it was too early in the evening for 
the DI to come down, but when I saw the house across the yard on fire 
and heard an alarming trumpet, my doubts vanished. My mother, who was 
then.eighty years old, climbed out of the window with two of her grand­
children and rushed across the yard to the madrasah. I helped my 
frightened sister and we made it safely. There I learned that my 
brother-in-law had already been shot to death by the TII and thrown 
into one of the burning houses. I had to calm down his frightened
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children. They told me that he was late coming home from the pengajian 
in a nearby village and that when he rushed out of the house on hearing 
the trumpet, he was immediately shot by the TII. Four other villagers 
were killed in the same way, including one of my cousin’s sons.
MMy brother, Kiai Yusuf, was already at the top of the mosque 
tower. It was Divine takdiv [providence] because I recalled that when 
my brother erected the mosque-madrasah complex in 1933, the architect’s 
sketches did not include the tower. Yet for some reason my brother 
insisted on adding a tall tower between the mosque and the madrasah 
sections. Only God knew that this particular tower would come to save 
thousands of people twenty years later. The Til’s tactics of burning 
houses was also beneficial because it made the defense from the madra­
sah much easier than otherwise.
’’The major trouble was that we had only seven weapons besides the 
kiai’s Canadian pistol. The five Japanese carbines left by the Sili- 
wangi company when they were pulled out, and the two dorlok [locally 
produced handmade shotguns] were not very efficient. But we had plenty 
of grenades. One of my nephews, a former Peta soldier and then an 
active member of the Siliwangi, was away from the village on duty in 
Jakarta and I missed him badly. But my brother’s personal guards were 
incredibly calm and skillful, and they gave me confidence again. Those 
soft-spoken, humble and ignorant refugees from Sindangheula were even 
braver than my brother. They looked as if they had nothing to fear. 
Some of them who survived still live in the village and whenever I get 
angry at them, I calm myself by remembering how grateful we were to 
them that particular evening. Unlike the members of the TNI, these 
private soldiers receive no pension and today I always try to help them 
whenever they have any financial problems.
’’The battle lasted until three o ’clock in the morning, shortly 
before the subuh [dawn] prayers. During the night the three thousand 
TII soldiers made three advances. My brother stood at the top of the 
tower throwing grenades at the advancing TII soldiers on the ground.
His shadow against the flames was seen from far away like in a wayang 
play. All the windows in the madrasah were shattered by bullets and 
many people inside the building suffered cuts from the flying glass. 
Bohim, one of the kiai’s private soldiers, was bleeding from his fore­
head but still continued firing his weapon. I went around the building 
and helped the wounded. Aisa from Sindangheula was shot, the bullet 
passing through her and the baby she was carrying when she walked 
through the madrasah. Both of them were killed instantly.
’’Because of the constant firing, two of the weapons had broken 
down and only five remained in working order. Soon afterward, one more 
broke down. Oyoh, another of my brothers’ guards, ran out of ammuni­
tion and decided to sacrifice himself to save my brother. He said that 
it would be his last contribution to the community. He grasped a gre­
nade and despite other people’s efforts to stop him, he dashed out of 
the building, approached some TII soldiers, threw a grenade and was 
shot to death by other TII soldiers before he could return to the 
building.
’’There were enough grenades, but ammunition was in short supply, 
so my brother ordered his soldiers to shoot only at those of the enemy 
who were actually advancing. Each TII attack lasted from two or three 
hours. Then they rested for about a half an hour before the shooting 
started again. We wished that somehow the TNI would come and rescue 
us before the TII took over completely and destroyed us all. I heard
later on that the TNI was already at the corner of the highway about a 
mile from the village but could not break through the encircling Til 
lines.
f!Inside the madrasah people continued to pray for God’s help and 
the children kept crying from fear, hearing the shooting which sounded 
like an endless thunder. The most fearful moment came for all of us 
when the Til attempted to break down the western wall of the mosque. 
Because the west is our kiblat [the direction of prayers towards Mecca] 
the wall had no windows and hence no place from which guns could be 
fired. It provided a convenient hiding place for the Til to work their 
entry through the wall. The wall, however, was too thick for them.
Its stone foundation went as high as a meter and a half and God did not 
mengizinkan [allow] it to happen. They threw a grenade at the wall but 
it only made a tiny hole through which no one could crawl or shoot.
We had three more casualties. Bulo tried to throw a grenade at the Til 
but missed. The grenade hit a window and bounced back killing the man 
instantly. Two other soldiers were shot by the Til.
"Despite all their efforts, the TII failed to finish us off. On 
our side only four soldiers and seven civilians were killed. It was 
nothing but a remarkable work of God. We had only seven weapons and 
the TII had a thousand. When morning prayer time approached, and the 
sun was about to rise, the TII began to retreat. Only, when all the 
TII had gone to the mountains did people in the madrasah come out for 
the first time. The nightmare that had lasted eight hours was over.
The sun was already high and they saw the ashes of their burned homes. 
They had lost food, clothes, shelter and everything else. Fortunately, 
my house was only half burned and my storage room was intact. My 
brother had warned me to save food at several places so that if one 
stock was burned, we would still be left with others. I ordered my 
daughters to prepare meals for all the survivors. Everyone was hungry 
but they could not eat much. It took us a while before we overcame the 
fear and shock of the night. Some of us had lost our beloved ones and 
had to pick their bones out of the ashes for burial.
"A convoy from the Red Cross arrived from Garut bringing us food 
and clothes, and by late afternoon Governor Sanusi of West Java along 
with [Armed Forces Chief of Staff] General Simatupang arrived from 
Jakarta to express their grief and to show their respect and surprise 
at our soldiers’ courage. A German doctor who came along with the con­
voy gave us medicine and took care of those who were seriously wounded.
Within several days life returned to normal. But dozens of dead 
TII soldiers were found in the fish ponds and sawah and for a long time 
people would not work in the fields, for fear that they might stumble 
over a severed leg or head. Nor could people sell fish from the ponds 
for, according to the tenets of Islam, fish taken from a pond where a 
corpse has rotted may not be eaten or sold.
The DI never again attacked Cipari with the same fury as on that 
night, but an ineradicable fear still remains among the women and chil­
dren. Some old women complain that even now they become frightened 
when they hear steps outside their house in the middle of the night. 
Kiai Yusuf moved back to Wanaraja, and his madrasah and living quarters 
were.restored with the help of his followers. His courage and bravery 
have made him a focal figure and hero of the local folklore concerning 
that period. People believe that he must have achieved the state of 
marifa*at, the highest possible state of holiness for a Sufi, and ac­
quired supernatural powers. Every Thursday he still gives a pengajian
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to a public audience, and people from the mountains and from far away 
come to attend. It appears that most of these hundreds of attendants 
come not so much to learn from the depth of his lectures but rather to 
gain spiritual merit from being in the presence of the kiai, whom they 
consider far closer to the Divine than they themselves.
The tower of the mosque has been left as it was on that night, 
and stands as a symbol of a recent historic milestone for the villag­
ers. It has become a custom for villagers returning home after a long 
journey or after working as seasonal migrant laborers to climb the 
tower first, to strengthen their communion with the recent past, Nature, 
their native village, and, ultimately, the Divine.
